On December 25, 1995, the Turkish-flagged cargo ship Figen Akat, en route from Çanakkale to Israel, ran aground on the Kardak Rocks, about 6 km from Bodrum. Within an hour, Erim Akat, the owner of the ship, was notified. The following evening, two officials from a Turkish insurance company reached the ship and analyzed the situation to see how it could be salvaged, while Turkish and Greek warships were anchored near the Figen Akat, observing from a distance. Two days after the accident, the Greek Ambassador to Ankara sent a note to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, claiming that Figen Akat was in Greek territorial waters and demanding that the rescue operation be halted. The Ministry rejected this claim in another note. On the same day, in an unexpected move, a Greek warship and three attack boats blockaded the Figen Akat. By means of a steel cable attached to the ship, the Figen Akat was lowered from the rocks into the sea. In a clever move, the crew cut the steel cable, freeing the ship at sea, and Figen Akat managed to cross into Turkish territorial waters.

In the following week, while the diplomatic agenda was calm, the Aegean began to boil with the second note issued by Greece. The note claimed that the Kardak Rocks had been ceded to the Greeks by an agreement between Italy and Greece in 1932 and underlined that the rocks belonged to Greece (32.Gün, 1996). (32.Gün, 1996) As a result of more intensive investigations by the Turkish Foreign Ministry, land registry records showing that the Kardak Rocks belonged to Türkiye were uncovered at the Bodrum District Governorate. Thus, Türkiye once again rejected the note.

On January 19, 1996, Kostas Simitis received a vote of confidence and became Prime Minister. The very next day, the press organs close to his political rival and then (Greek) Minister of National Defense Gerasimos Arsenis began to publish deliberate publications claiming that Greek land was being given to the Turks. This electoral gift to Simitis signaled the need for urgent action. In response, the mayor of one of the neighboring Greek islands, accompanied by a priest, went to the eastern Kardak Rocks, planted a Greek flag and sang the Greek anthem. The response from the Turkish side was not delayed, and on January 27, Turkish journalists took down the Greek flag and raised the Turkish flag on the rock. Inal Batu, the then Deputy Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, said in a press statement: “We are not in a flag race with the Greeks”, which was a hidden proof of the seriousness of the matter. Then the Greek army landed troops on the rocks and blockaded the rocks from the sea.

This last straw, the last drop in the Aegean, finally prompted Ankara to act. The Republic of Türkiye invoked the principle of reciprocity. On the night of January 29, Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, Foreign Minister Deniz Baykal and Naval Forces Commander Güven Erkaya attended the meeting and the decision was clear:

“That flag will come down, that soldier will leave.”

Tansu Çiller, 1996

Twelve Turkish SAT commandos were selected for the operation, the aim was to slip past the Greek ships and infiltrate the island to the east. In fact, it was an operation of deception. After the commandos set sail from Bodrum, Turkish helicopters distracted the Greek fleet by pretending to land troops on their frigate, and the boats carrying the SAT commandos managed to reach the Western Kardak Rocks. The Greek flag on the island was taken down by Turkish commandos and the Turkish flag was raised in its place. The news of the raising of the flag caused great joy in Turkish public opinion, but more importantly, a diplomatic crisis was ended without a single shot being fired.

A country’s lack of interest in the resolution of disputes, a crisis caused by unilateral practices, or a country that simply reacts and is unprepared in crisis management… Many of these and similar interpretations can be made in the Kardak incident. However, on the basis of protecting interests and avoiding hot conflict, it can be said that Türkiye successfully managed and ended this crisis. As Casus Diplomacy, although we refer to the term “Casus Belli” and underline that world order can only be established through diplomacy and dialogue, not war, we cannot deny the necessity of coordination of civilian and military decision-making processes in such crises. (Şıhmantepe, 2013) American political scientist Alexander L.

“It is in the interest of countries to have a military build-up ready to support diplomacy.”

Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management

It should also be noted that this strategy, called “coercive diplomacy “, is one of the branches of the diplomacy tree. In conclusion, Türkiye and Greece are two neighboring countries with a common history of nearly 400 years and represent an exception. Today, there are no other two countries in the world that gained their independence against each other and celebrate their victories against each other as independence days. A war, conflict or disagreement would not benefit these two countries, but has the potential for great harm and damage. As the statesman, thinker and historian Ibn Khaldun stated centuries ago,

“States that shape their policies not according to race, religion or sect but according to geography tend to outlive others.”

However, as of today, some of the more than 150 islands, islets and rocks that are Turkish territory according to international agreements (registered in the State Inventory of the Republic of Türkiye) are occupied by Greece. Looking at the exact number, approximately 20 islands, islets and rocks are currently under Greek occupation. (Dündar, 2020) Since 2004, Greece has been building institutions such as municipal buildings and police stations on these islands, arming them and flying its flag. In addition to the occupation, Greece aims to increase its territorial waters to 12 miles by violating the continental shelf and to prevent the Republic of Türkiye from exceeding three miles in the Aegean Sea. (Aka, 2019) This intention is diametrically opposed to Türkiye’s “Blue Homeland” doctrine and constitutes a major obstacle for Türkiye to benefit from the energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean. Considering the F-35 issue that has been on the agenda in recent months, the biased mediation of the United States and Prime Minister Mitsotakis’ speech to the US Congress, a historic break in Turkish-Greek relations is taking place. Emphasizing the Turkish-Greek friendship of the Ismail Cem era today seems not only overly romantic but also delusional. In past experiences, Greece has never been as reckless and provocative as it is today. Türkiye’s increasingly damaged image in the EU, NATO and the US, as well as its economic crisis, explain Greece’s self-confidence and courage. What will happen in the future is of course unknown, but the diplomatic conjuncture seems to determine the fate of these two countries.

Omer Valyozoglu

Source

Aka, T. (2019). The Problem of Islands, Islets and Rocks in Turkish-Greek Relations. Tekirdağ Namık Kemal University Institute of Social Sciences, 1-68.

Dündar, U. (2020, September 11). 7 islands and 13 islets occupied by Greece belong to Türkiye. sozcu.com.tr: Retrieved from https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2020/yazarlar/ugur-dundar/yunanistanin-isgal-ettigi-7-ada-ile-13-adacik-turkiyeye-aittir-6032251/amp/ 

32.DAY (Author). (1996). Kardak Crisis [Motion Picture]. Türkiye. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_xi9B1nsCBQ&ab_channel=32.G%C3%BCnAr%C5%9Fivi

Şıhmantepe, A. (2013). Analyzing the Kardak Crisis Process in terms of Crisis Management Principles. Security Strategies, 9(17), 127-155.