Livet forstås baglæns, men må leves forlæns.
Soren Kierkegaard.

The Pacific Islands Forum, or Pacific Islands Forum (PAF), was established in 1971 as the South Pacific Forum with the participation of seven island states in the Pacific Ocean – Australia, Western Samao, Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, Tonga and New Zealand. In 1999, it was renamed the Pacific Islands Forum and expanded to include eleven new member states – French Polynesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, New Caledonia, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Currently, PAF has 18 Dialogue Partners, including Türkiye.

The fifty-first PAF meeting at the level of heads of state and government took place in Suva, the capital of Fiji, on July 11-14, 2022. On the second day, the Vice President of the United States of America (USA) Kamala Harris participated in the Forum via videoconference and delivered a speech. Emphasizing that the Americans are “a Pacific nation”, Harris declared that they want to strengthen the partnership with the Pacific islands. “We recognize that as Pacific islands, you have not received the diplomatic attention and support you deserve. That is why I am here today to tell you directly: We are going to change that.” Haris went on to say that the United States will deepen its relationship with the Pacific islands and usher in a new era of engagement.

The 2021 PAF meeting was addressed by US President Joseph Biden. It should be noted that this was the first participation of an American president in a PAF meeting. In 2022, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Fiji and launched the US Indo-Pacific strategy there. Kamala Harris’ pledge to deepen relations with the Pacific islands is in fact a restatement of this strategy. The aforementioned strategy is not new: it is a new adaptation of the ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy announced by US President Barack Obama in his 2011 address to the Australian Parliament.

This strategic initiative, which began with Obama, is just the manifestation of a rising US concern. And that concern is the rise of China as a political, economic and military power. Indeed, Kamala Harris’ speech at the PAF meeting came a month and a half after Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s 10-day tour of the Pacific. Yi visited Fiji, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea and Tonga, and while in Fiji, he also met via videoconference with diplomatic representatives from ten Pacific islands.

President Donald Trump has been the most vocal about the growing US concern towards China. Trump also took concrete steps and started to impose high tariffs on Chinese goods, risking starting a trade war. In the same vein, Biden established a security pact called AUKUS with Australia and the UK. This pact will provide Australia, which is worried about China’s rise, with nuclear submarine technology and serve to recruit another power to balance China’s military power in the Pacific region.

The US is likely to similarly recruit and train India as a military power against China. It is almost certain that Japan and South Korea will join the anti-China coalition that the US is/will be building. In fact, Japan, and of course South Korea, is probably more concerned about China’s rise than the US or Australia. It is not surprising that the assassination of former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe was greeted with enthusiasm by Chinese nationalists. Abe was deeply troubled by China’s rise. As early as 2007, he had even offered India a ‘strategic global partnership’ to counter China’s bullying behavior, and his contribution to the emergence of what China calls the ‘exclusive clique’ – the anti-China quartet of the US, Australia, India and Japan – was undeniable.

It is now possible to see the sides in the ongoing global power struggle between the US and China, which is likely to intensify in the decades to come. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has allowed us to see the sides more clearly. On the one hand, there is the core bloc of China and Russia, with Pakistan, Iran, and, of course, North Korea, all of which are certain to join this bloc. On the other side, the core bloc of the United States and the European Union, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, which are already aligned with that bloc, and India, which is likely to be aligned with that bloc, although it is still trying to remain neutral.

The Indo-Pacific Ocean is undoubtedly the most critical region in the ongoing US-China rivalry, but it is not the only one. In Africa and even in the polar regions, the global power rivalry between the parties is and will continue. It is almost impossible for this rivalry to bypass the Middle East. Indeed, we have already begun to witness the early stages of this rivalry in recent years. This is the question that will occupy Middle East experts for decades to come. Who will be on which side.

What follows is of course an attempt to predict the future and every attempt at prediction is subject to human limitations. With this in mind, it is possible to predict that Iran and Syria will be very clearly on the Sino-Russian side. I think Türkiye will maintain its current neutral position between the US and China-Russia for a while. However, Türkiye’s ultimate side will be determined by the nature of the regime.

It is no secret that the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia and Egypt have long been unhappy with US policy towards the Middle East. It is not just the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In fact, it is not even a problem. The Arab trio has already reconciled with Israel. The problem is that the US is not pursuing a consequential policy against Iran. It is the Iranian factor that brings the trio together with Israel. The same factor will determine whether the trio will join the China-Russia bloc.

The question is whether China will pursue a policy that satisfies the Arab trio and of course Israel on Iran. Note that even the US’s rather rigid Iran policy does not satisfy the quartet. Whether China will make an effort to do so, even on paper, remains to be seen. Especially when Iran’s bilateral relations with both China and Russia are extremely good. In the end, it is possible to argue that the Arab trio and Israel will also be part of the US-led bloc.

Birol Başkan

Political Scientist – Non-Resident Fellow, Middle East Institute 

^[1] For the text of the speech, see https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/07/12/remarks-by-vice-president-harris-at-the-pacific-islands-forum/^[1] For the text of the strategy, see https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf

Livet forstås baglæns, men må leves forlæns.
Soren Kierkegaard.

The Pacific Islands Forum, or Pacific Islands Forum (PAF), was established in 1971 as the South Pacific Forum with the participation of seven island states in the Pacific Ocean – Australia, Western Samao, Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, Tonga and New Zealand. In 1999, it was renamed the Pacific Islands Forum and expanded to include eleven new member states – French Polynesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, New Caledonia, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Currently, PAF has 18 Dialogue Partners, including Türkiye.

The fifty-first PAF meeting at the level of heads of state and government took place in Suva, the capital of Fiji, on July 11-14, 2022. On the second day, the Vice President of the United States of America (USA) Kamala Harris participated in the Forum via videoconference and delivered a speech. Emphasizing that the Americans are “a Pacific nation”, Harris declared that they want to strengthen the partnership with the Pacific islands. “We recognize that as Pacific islands, you have not received the diplomatic attention and support you deserve. That is why I am here today to tell you directly: We are going to change that.” Haris went on to say that the United States will deepen its relationship with the Pacific islands and usher in a new era of engagement.

The 2021 PAF meeting was addressed by US President Joseph Biden. It should be noted that this was the first participation of an American president in a PAF meeting. In 2022, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Fiji and launched the US Indo-Pacific strategy there. Kamala Harris’ pledge to deepen relations with the Pacific islands is in fact a restatement of this strategy. The aforementioned strategy is not new: it is a new adaptation of the ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy announced by US President Barack Obama in his 2011 address to the Australian Parliament.

This strategic initiative, which began with Obama, is just the manifestation of a rising US concern. And that concern is the rise of China as a political, economic and military power. Indeed, Kamala Harris’ speech at the PAF meeting came a month and a half after Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s 10-day tour of the Pacific. Yi visited Fiji, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea and Tonga, and while in Fiji, he also met via videoconference with diplomatic representatives from ten Pacific islands.

President Donald Trump has been the most vocal about the growing US concern towards China. Trump also took concrete steps and started to impose high tariffs on Chinese goods, risking starting a trade war. In the same vein, Biden established a security pact called AUKUS with Australia and the UK. This pact will provide Australia, which is worried about China’s rise, with nuclear submarine technology and serve to recruit another power to balance China’s military power in the Pacific region.

The US is likely to similarly recruit and train India as a military power against China. It is almost certain that Japan and South Korea will join the anti-China coalition that the US is/will be building. In fact, Japan, and of course South Korea, is probably more concerned about China’s rise than the US or Australia. It is not surprising that the assassination of former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe was greeted with enthusiasm by Chinese nationalists. Abe was deeply troubled by China’s rise. As early as 2007, he had even offered India a ‘strategic global partnership’ to counter China’s bullying behavior, and his contribution to the emergence of what China calls the ‘exclusive clique’ – the anti-China quartet of the US, Australia, India and Japan – was undeniable.

It is now possible to see the sides in the ongoing global power struggle between the US and China, which is likely to intensify in the decades to come. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has allowed us to see the sides more clearly. On the one hand, there is the core bloc of China and Russia, with Pakistan, Iran, and, of course, North Korea, all of which are certain to join this bloc. On the other side, the core bloc of the United States and the European Union, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, which are already aligned with that bloc, and India, which is likely to be aligned with that bloc, although it is still trying to remain neutral.

The Indo-Pacific Ocean is undoubtedly the most critical region in the ongoing US-China rivalry, but it is not the only one. In Africa and even in the polar regions, the global power rivalry between the parties is and will continue. It is almost impossible for this rivalry to bypass the Middle East. Indeed, we have already begun to witness the early stages of this rivalry in recent years. This is the question that will occupy Middle East experts for decades to come. Who will be on which side.

What follows is of course an attempt to predict the future and every attempt at prediction is subject to human limitations. With this in mind, it is possible to predict that Iran and Syria will be very clearly on the Sino-Russian side. I think Türkiye will maintain its current neutral position between the US and China-Russia for a while. However, Türkiye’s ultimate side will be determined by the nature of the regime.

It is no secret that the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia and Egypt have long been unhappy with US policy towards the Middle East. It is not just the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In fact, it is not even a problem. The Arab trio has already reconciled with Israel. The problem is that the US is not pursuing a consequential policy against Iran. It is the Iranian factor that brings the trio together with Israel. The same factor will determine whether the trio will join the China-Russia bloc.

The question is whether China will pursue a policy that satisfies the Arab trio and of course Israel on Iran. Note that even the US’s rather rigid Iran policy does not satisfy the quartet. Whether China will make an effort to do so, even on paper, remains to be seen. Especially when Iran’s bilateral relations with both China and Russia are extremely good. In the end, it is possible to argue that the Arab trio and Israel will also be part of the US-led bloc.

Birol Başkan

Political Scientist – Non-Resident Fellow, Middle East Institute 

^[1] For the text of the speech, see https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/07/12/remarks-by-vice-president-harris-at-the-pacific-islands-forum/^[1] For the text of the strategy, see https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf